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The commonly used Standards of Care for people with gender dysphoria, including
those of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health and The Royal
College of Psychiatrists in the United Kingdom, as well as those standards used in many
other countries, usually require that two signatures of approval from qualified mental
health professionals be provided before genital reconstructive surgery (GRS) 
sometimes called sexual reassignment surgery or gender confirmation surgery  is
undertaken. This is different from surgeries which are similarly irreversible and remove
reproductive capacity carried out on cisgender people. This paper explores the trans-
specific issues from a standpoint of medical ethics and argues that, provided sufficient
safeguards are in place, including assessment within a multidisciplinary team, a nuanced
approach utilising a single signature may instead be appropriate.
Keywords: Standards of Care; gender dysphoria; trans-sexualism; transgender; genital
reconstructive surgery; medical ethics
Introduction
The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (now known as the
World Professional Association of Transgender Health  WPATH) authored the first
Standards of Care (SoC) for people with gender dysphoria with the express purpose of
articulating professional consensus regarding the psychiatric, psychological, medical, and
surgical management of gender dysphoria (Walker et al., 1985) and give specific
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“minimum” requirements as pre-requisites to hormone treatment and sex reassignment
surgeries (SRS), including genital reconstructive surgery (GRS). The current version 7
recommends that one written opinion from a qualified mental health professional is
required prior to starting hormone treatment and in order to undergo chest surgeries such
as bilateral mastectomy and associated reconstruction for trans men1 or augmentation
mammoplasty for trans women2 (Coleman et al., 2012). In contrast, two referrals from
qualified mental health professionals who have independently assessed the patient for eli-
gibility and readiness are needed for genital surgeries such as hysterectomy, salpingo-
oophorectomy, bilateral orchidectomy and genital reconstructive surgeries to form
a neovagina or neophallus. These written opinions must also include a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or trans-sexualism (World Health
Organization [WHO], 1992). It is likely that this will, of course, include the analogous
WHO diagnosis in the ICD-11 (International Classification of Diseases version 11) which
may be called gender incongruence; however, we shall use the term gender dysphoria
throughout this paper for ease of readability.
Currently, the WPATH SoC are the standards most commonly used by clinicians
working in gender clinics, sometimes called gender identity clinic services, internation-
ally. In European countries, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and the United
Kingdom where health care, including hormone treatment and GRS, is provided for all
citizens free at point of delivery, national SoC have been developed, and are developing,
which are often largely based on the principles underpinning the WPATH SoC. In the
United Kingdom, for instance, contributors to WPATH’s current SoC are members of the
Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Intercollegiate Committee on the United Kingdom SoC
(Wylie et al., 2014). However, it is important to note that there is a key difference
between privately and publicly funded health care. In the former, an absence of harm
from treatment may be sufficient, provided the person accessing the intervention is mak-
ing an informed decision. In the latter, there must be a demonstrable positive benefit of
treatment for patients. This is because those paying for interventions for others (tax-
payers) rightly expect their money to have been put towards some practical end and not
merely be used to fulfil a desire on the part of the person seeking services. This creates a
difference in practical application between the WPATH SoC and the United Kingdom
SoC, as the United Kingdom SoC are generally used for publicly funded interventions.
The main aim for all of these SoC is to create a set of clinical guidelines which pro-
vide standards that secure a high quality care pathway for people with gender dysphoria,
and consequently facilitate equality of access to assessment and treatment at gender
clinics. However, before hormone and surgical treatment can commence, specific eligibil-
ity criteria must be met. It is difficult to define eligibility criteria in a truly objective man-
ner (Bouman & Richards, 2013) due to a dearth of level one evidence in the field (cf.
Centre for Evidence Based Medicine [CEBM], 2013) and consequently determination of
these criteria rests largely upon consensus between clinicians and non-clinicians develop-
ing SoC. It can be argued, however, that SoC establish and maintain medical and psycho-
logical “gatekeeping” through these eligibility criteria for people with gender dysphoria
 meaning that the legitimate expression of the self-identified gender of the individual is
not necessarily validated by SoC as written. Thus, the utilisation of SoC in determining
whether a patient may receive treatment necessarily causes the individual’s wishes to be
balanced against the possibility that any intervention may cause harm to the patient.
In this paper, we will examine one particular aspect of both the WPATH and United
Kingdom SoC which exemplifies such medical and psychological “gatekeeping” of serv-
ices: that two written opinions from qualified mental health professionals are necessary
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for people with gender dysphoria to receive genital surgeries. The purpose of the second
opinion is not discussed or clarified in any of the current SoC, despite the fact that obtain-
ing the second opinion can cause delays in treatment, especially in sparsely populated
areas, and may be seen by some as unduly invasive. Indeed, in the broader field of medi-
cine aside from trans services, there are very few cases in which two opinions for physio-
logical interventions are required and those which do mostly involve people who lack
capacity to consent to treatment or people who are seen outside of a multidisciplinary
team. For example, in the case of electroconvulsive treatment for a life threatening or
severely debilitating psychiatric illness during which the patient is a minor or lacks capac-
ity to consent to treatment (Cairns et al., 2005; Cresswell, Murphy, & Hodge, 2012). Our
intent, therefore, is to explicitly consider whether it is justified to require two written
opinions for genital surgeries as a rule of general application, and especially to consider
whether in cases where a patient is seen in a multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary team a
single signature might be used instead.
Gender dysphoria  a unique consideration
The arguments concerning the considerations and approvals pertaining to what is today
referred to as gender dysphoria or trans-sexualism, and may become known as gender
incongruence in the forthcoming ICD-11, are based in a historical context in which gender
dysphoria is one of the few psychiatric diagnoses for which the treatment does not involve
reduction of the “symptoms” through addressing the psychology of the patient directly.
Instead it concerns a transformation of the body to align with the patient’s subjective expe-
rience of gender (Meyer-Bahlburg, 2010). Consequently, there has been a long-standing
concern, which continues to this day in some quarters, that “psychiatric” patients may be
having their delusions colluded with, or at least that an irreversible decision may be made
which is later regretted. This stance is slowly changing with the realisation that trans peo-
ple are no more likely that cisgender3 people to suffer from mental illnesses aside from
minority stress (Cole, O’Boyle, Emory, & Meyer III, 1997; Colizzi, Costa, & Todarello,
2014; Haraldsen & Dahl, 2000; Hill, Rozanski, Carfagnini, & Willoughby, 2005; Hoshiai
et al., 2010; Kersting et al., 2003; Simon, Zsolt, Fogd, & Czobor, 2011) and a consequent
movement towards seeing trans people as mentally healthy individuals capable of making
their own decisions about their bodies. As Drescher (2010) has noted:
It is not unthinkable that, in the future, gender variant people transitioning from one sex to
another might be treated by medical specialists who, like obstetricians, use medical and sur-
gical interventions to facilitate what society considers to be a normal life event. . .although
the psychosocial context for evaluating gender variance is rapidly changing, today there is a
practical concern that it might be difficult to convince most people that transition from one
sex to another is as ‘normal’ as childbirth. (p. 453)
Consequently, we shall illustrate our consideration of trans people being treated as a
special medico-legal case by considering the example of a trans woman who wishes to
undergo an orchidectomy as part of genital surgery alongside a consideration of a man
wishing to have an orchidectomy for a non-trans related matter.4 This procedure for a trans
woman is one of the enumerated surgical procedures in the WPATH SoC and United
Kingdom SoC requiring two referrals from qualified mental health professionals who have
independently assessed a patient for eligibility and readiness. In addition, these SoC state
that, in order to proceed with this type of genital surgery, patients must have received
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treatment consisting of cross-sex hormone therapy and at least one year of continuous liv-
ing in a gender role that is congruent with one’s identity. In contrast to the example given
above, a cisgender male with chronic scrotal pain does not require any written psychiatric
opinion for an orchidectomy nor does he have to be in pain or distress for a minimum of
one year before surgery can take place (Keoghane & Sullivan, 2010). Chronic scrotal
pain  which has a greater prevalence than gender dysphoria (Leslie, Illing, Cranston, &
Guillebaud, 2007)  refers to an ill-understood complex of symptoms wherein patients
often have no identifiable cause to explain their discomfort. Like gender dysphoria, chronic
scrotal pain requires a clinical diagnosis based on symptoms which are often reported rather
than immediately observed. Consequently, it is the surgeon in consultation with the patient
who decides whether an orchidectomy is potentially beneficial. Similarly, a cisgender
female with abnormal genital tract bleeding based in the uterus and found in the absence of
demonstrable structural or organic pathology (known as dysfunctional uterine bleeding 
DUB, Edozien, 2006) does not require a psychiatric opinion for a hysterectomy and nor
does she have to wait a minimum of one year to undergo surgery. As with chronic scrotal
pain and gender dysphoria, DUB is not an acute medical condition (Phipps, 2007) which
would invite a different set of ethical considerations based upon immediacy of need.
With regard to such chronic conditions then, the centre of clinical decision making in
modern medicine is the moral imperative to respect the autonomy of the patient to make
an informed decision regarding surgery (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; O’Neill, 2002).
As there is general agreement that in ethical matters like cases should be treated alike
(Veatch, 2003), treating trans people differently in respect of genital surgery must be sup-
ported by well-reasoned arguments.
Reasons for medical/psychological “gatekeeping” regarding genital surgeries for
gender dysphoria
There are various arguments used to justify the necessity of two mental health profes-
sionals’ written opinions as to the advisability of genital surgery. One such argument,
often raised by clinicians, is that genital surgery involves removal of healthy tissue. Such
surgical intervention can thus only be endorsed if there is sufficient confidence that the
intervention is in the best interest of the patient, and hence a robust assessment system
needs to be in place (Barrett, 2007; Ettner, Monstrey, & Eyler, 2007). In order to be con-
sistent, however, this condition ought to apply in all procedures which require the
removal of healthy tissue, whether concerning gender dysphoria or otherwise. The
removal of healthy tissue takes place in the aforementioned patients with chronic scrotal
pain and DUB, without such an assessment system requiring two independent profes-
sional opinions. Indeed, a trans woman who seeks GRS and has been living continuously
in her desired female gender role for a minimum of one year, and more realistically two,
has had a significant amount of time to reflect about the benefits and risks of the surgery.
Furthermore, as part of the ongoing support of the trans person at a gender clinic, the mat-
ter will have been brought up on several occasions by supporting professionals in the mul-
tidisciplinary/interdisciplinary team prior to the final evaluation. There is also a
significant body of academic evidence suggesting that such genital surgeries improve the
overall quality of life of carefully evaluated trans-sexual people who have had a consis-
tent desire for such surgeries and who are not sexually motivated (De Cuypere et al.,
2005; Gijs & Brewaeys, 2007; Gooren, 2011; Klein & Gorzalka, 2009; Murad et al.,
2010; NHS Audit, Information & Analysis Unit, 2008; Smith, Van Goozen, Kuiper, &
Cohen-Kettenis, 2005).
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Irreversibility
A further argument which follows from that pertaining to the loss of healthy tissue above,
is that of the number of signatures required to allow other irreversible elective surgeries
such as live kidney donation, and cosmetic facial, breast and genital surgery, for example.
In such cases (when not related to gender dysphoria), either a single or no psychiatric or
psychological opinion is required, often at the discretion of the operating surgeon. What
then differentiates trans people from their cisgender counterparts in this regard? One
argument often made is that the two-signature system limits reversion to the birth
assigned gender role after gender-related surgeries as reversion can have catastrophic psy-
chological sequelae. Indeed, around 2%3% of trans people who have undergone genital
surgery regret it5 and revert to their assigned gender role (Landen, Wa

linder, Hambert, &
Lundstr€om, 1998; Lawrence, 2003; Michel, Ansseau, Legros, Pitchot, & Mormont, 2002;
Nieder et al., 2013), although this is lower in areas which have stringent requirements
before surgery. Whether this is an acceptable margin for such a complex procedure, what
causes those reversions, and whether two signatures from within a multidisciplinary/inter-
disciplinary team avert more reversions are the pertinent points here. The question
remains the balance which must be struck between draconian paternalism and cata-
strophic outcomes at the taxpayers’ expense. As things stand, genital surgery improves
the quality of life for most trans-sexual people (Murad et al., 2010) and it is consequently
hard to imagine any other major life decision, such as whether to marry, whether to have
children, whether to make a particular career choice and the like  which would yield
such an overwhelmingly positive outcome (Lev, 2009). It is not clear, however, whether
it is the two-signature system which is material to that excellent outcome, or whether it is
the process of decision-making, perhaps living in role for a certain time, for example,
which is integral to it.
Loss of fertility
A special case of irreversible surgeries might be that of such surgeries which carry with
them an attendant loss of fertility, such as orchidectomy and hysterectomy (whether for
trans reasons or otherwise). It is argued by some clinicians that in such cases, stringent
selection criteria applied through two independent professional opinions reduces the num-
ber of regrets about fertility loss through the necessity of having fully considered the
implications of the decision. Indeed, this might seem a sensible precaution as in cases of
hysterectomy unrelated to gender dysphoria, approximately 3% of cisgender6 females
regret hysterectomy and more than a quarter of these females showed some regret regard-
ing the loss of fertility (Farquhar, Harvey, Yu, Sadler, & Stewart, 2006). The complexity
arises, however, as fertility loss is not necessarily absolute, since the advent of modern
technologies which include sperm and egg retrieval and storage (Di Santo, Tarozzi,
Nadalini, & Borini, 2012; Loutradi et al., 2008). Furthermore, the argument for two signa-
tures of approval for removal of reproductive capacity is, of course, equally applicable in
cases involving removal of reproductive capacity for other difficulties of an apparently
non-physiological aetiology  as in the cisgender male patient with chronic scrotal pain
and cisgender female patient with DUB seen above. If we dismiss the notion that these
procedures should also have a two-signature approval process, we return to the consider-
ation of a one signature process applied fairly universally to both trans and non-trans
health care. Consequently, a nuanced approach would seem warranted in these cases, per-
haps taking into account the likelihood of a live birth from any cryopreservation methods,
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the age of the patient, whether the patient has children already and do not wish to have
any more, etc. (Richards & Seal, 2014; T’Sjoen, Van Caenegem, & Wierckx, 2013).
The special case of trans patients?
There is, of course, no physiological test for gender dysphoria and the literature is fairly
unequivocal in suggesting that only trans people who are indeed trans-sexual benefit from
genital surgeries (Gijs & Brewaeys, 2007). Unfortunately there are several types of pre-
sentation which may appear to be trans-sexualism at first glance but which, upon further
investigation, prove not to be so. These include some forms of psychosis, people with a
sexual motivation for transitioning and those people who are running from a painful real-
ity into a more comfortable fantasy. Such presentations may overlap with issues such as
chronic scrotal pain and DUB, but are, perhaps, more peculiar to people presenting to
trans services. It might be argued, therefore, that trans patients specifically should have
two signatures for genital surgery as a safeguard against such presentations being thought
to be trans-sexualism by a single practitioner. However, we argue that a robust ongoing
supportive assessment within a multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary team, including suffi-
cient documented time living in role, would obviate the need for two signatures as a mat-
ter of general application in most cases. Of course, in those cases in which a clinician is
unsure of the diagnosis, or likely prognosis, we would recommend referral for a second
opinion in line with all non-trans specific interventions.
The risk of the lone practitioner
One argument against single signature referrals for genital surgeries outside of the multi-
disciplinary team is that of the risk of being a lone practitioner. Indeed, although not
explicitly stated in the SoC, it appears the requirement for two written opinions to proceed
to genital surgeries is a consequence of the increased scrutiny imposed on clinical practice
by professional regulatory bodies and we might imagine the risk of the lone practitioner
forms a significant part of that concern. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Shipman
inquiry was set up to investigate the murder of patients carried out by Harold Shipman,
who worked as a single-handed GP (general practitioner, also known as family physi-
cian), with the main aim of the inquiry being to protect future patients from any harm
(Department of Health [DoH], 2004). Subsequently, many recommendations were made
by the General Medical Council (GMC), an organisation which regulates medical practice
and is set up to protect, promote and maintain the health and safety of the public by ensur-
ing proper standards in the practice of medicine (GMC, 2013).
The findings of the Shipman inquiry included recommendations to doctors working in
isolation as lone practitioners that they should ensure that appropriate professional net-
works are in place to facilitate consultation with colleagues and ensure regular perfor-
mance review is undertaken (GMC, 2006a, 2006b).
Within the field of trans health care, in 2007, lone practitioner Dr Russell Reid of Lon-
don, United Kingdom, a specialist in gender dysphoria, was found guilty of serious pro-
fessional misconduct. The main allegations concerned his failure to adhere to the
WPATH SoC, which might be argued that it could have acted as de facto collegiate stand-
ards. He had prescribed hormone treatment at a first appointment before a diagnosis of
trans-sexualism (WHO, 1992) had been made, and had also referred a patient for GRS
without obtaining a second written psychiatric opinion (Dyer, 2007). The GMC’s fitness
to practise panel-imposed stringent conditions on Dr Reid should he choose to return to
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clinical practice wherein he was no longer allowed to undertake clinical practice in the
area of gender dysphoria except within the National Health Service or in a hospital with a
clinical governance7 structure acceptable to the GMC (GMC, 2007). Dr Richard Curtis,
who took over Dr Reid’s private practice, is now facing similar charges before the GMC’s
fitness to practise panel (Batty, 2013). The message is clear: working with colleagues in
all areas of medicine, psychology, psychiatry, etc., is a good practice and in trans health
care is deemed to be imperative. What this does not necessarily show, however, is the
necessity of the two-signature system as safeguards may be put in place through clinical
governance and multidisciplinary working which would mitigate the difficulties cited
above but would not create possibly undue burdens on patients.
Paternalism and patient centred care
As seen above, medical regulatory bodies such as the GMC judge harshly those who do
not consider such SoC seriously enough. Indeed, adherence to existing SoC in any partic-
ular field, independent of whether these SoC are necessarily logical (or indeed fair), is
imperative for clinical practitioners. In the context of trans health care, SoC may be said
to appear to perpetuate an attitude of paternalism towards trans patients through consider-
ing that trans people should not, or cannot, take responsibility for their own, potentially
highly damaging, decisions. Perhaps this is in part because in several cases, trans people
have indeed not taken this type of responsibility as they have litigated against clinicians
who have provided them with treatments they have previously sought and have later
come to regret. The ethical question then is as to whether, or to what extent, clinicians
have a responsibility to save people who have capacity to consent from themselves. In
other areas of medicine, this “saving patients from themselves” is deemed no longer
appropriate and is being replaced by the culture of patient-centred medicine (DoH, 2004;
Little et al., 2001; Stewart, 2001). Indeed, in the example above, Dr Reid was repri-
manded by the GMC for not adhering to WPATH SoC, not because he was considered to
be a bad doctor, on the contrary. In fact, the GMC panel stated “. . .. it would [not] be in
the public interest to deprive the community of an experienced and otherwise well
respected doctor. . .” (GMC, 2007). The GMC did not pass judgment on the paternalism
implied by a requirement for two written opinions for SRS in WPATH SoC, but on Dr
Reid’s non-adherence to WPATH SoC in this respect.
Every day doctors working in private practice and in national health services carry out
irreversible procedures which may include the removal of healthy tissue or the loss of
reproductive capacity. Not all doctors necessarily work within a team, although they will
have to abide by the principles and values upon which good practice is founded which
will include working within a formal framework of colleagues (GMC, 2013). They are
consequently required to adhere to clinical governance processes, such as continuous pro-
fessional development and audit to maintain their license to practice, and may or may not
consult with a colleague regarding an irreversible intervention, although clinicians should
always seek to make a clinical decision together with the patient (O’Neill, 2002). In this
process, doctors are required to properly inform a patient regarding the proposed interven-
tion, ensure that a patient makes a voluntary decision, and ensure that a patient is compe-
tent to make an informed decision (GMC, 2006b) and consequently clinicians respect the
patient’s autonomy to make a decision regarding any clinical intervention the patient may
or may not wish to undergo. Even if non-intervention leads to the death of the patient, the
patient’s wish is still respected in certain cases (Gillon, 2000).
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This perhaps seems at odds with the two written opinions rule for genital surgeries for
trans people. Of particular pertinence, however, is the requirement for informed consent.
It might reasonably be argued that, in the case of trans people, informed consent can only
be obtained when a person has been living in a role which is congruent with their sense of
gender, and has fully considered the matter before them. Thus, the matter of signatures
may become subsumed within a requirement for adequate preparation and assessment,
rather than the crude safety measure of two signatures. We are consequently concerned
that the requirement for two signatures for genital surgeries in such cases could reflect
medical/psychological paternalism and potentially breaches the autonomy rights of trans-
sexual patients through failing to consider them to be moral equals and treating them
instead as less-than-independent determiners of their own good.
The value of two professional opinions
From a medical and/or psychological point of view, however, seeking two independent
professional opinions regarding interventions can be advantageous (GMC, 2013; Royal
College of Psychiatrists, 2009) as there can be benefits for the patient (Barqawi et al.,
2011; Hahm, Niemann, Lucas, & Frankel, 2001; Lehnhardt et al., 2008; Nirodi, Mitchell,
& Mindham, 2003). For example, two independent professionals are less likely to make
an erroneous decision about a patient’s eligibility for genital surgeries than one, and two
different clinicians may have different consultation styles where some will be better com-
municators than others and patients will disclose information more readily to them.
Indeed, patients may withhold vital information or omit pertinent matters that might
become apparent when two clinicians are involved and inconsistencies in the patient’s
narrative emerge (Lev, 2009). In some instances, a single clinician may be uncomfortable
with the pressure exerted upon them by particular patients to give a positive recommenda-
tion to proceed with genital surgeries or other interventions. In such cases, a second opin-
ion might be important in trying to establish what is in the patient’s best interest.
Furthermore, two professional opinions may give a patient greater confidence that their
decision to undergo genital surgery is appropriate. However, all of these things can be
carried out as part of the general work of a multidisciplinary team without the necessity
for two discrete opinions at the point of referral.
Indeed, all of the aforementioned are likely to be true in all cases where two profes-
sional opinions are given, whether medical or otherwise, and whether concerning trans-
sexualism or otherwise. One of the difficulties with the justification of the requirement
for two independent professional opinions in the context of the SoC for trans people con-
sidered here is that it appears to assume that the advantages of a second opinion in some
cases renders it necessary in all cases, moving from the particular to the general without
justification.
There may indeed be unusually complex or difficult cases where there is a clear clini-
cal need for further inquiry, exploration or opinion. In such cases, it is considered good
practice to request a second professional opinion (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2009).
However, that would not justify a rule of general or universal application and it applies
equally to all areas of medical and/or psychological practice.
The inconsistency of reasoning regarding the requirement for two written opinions
The treatment approaches for gender dysphoria in SoC follow the ethos of reversible
interventions before the irreversible, and implementation of continuous living in the
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desired gender role prior to eligibility for genital surgeries (Coleman et al., 2012; Davies
et al., 2013; Wylie et al., 2014) and the commencement of hormone treatment usually pre-
cedes these genital surgeries. Returning to our example above of a trans woman who
wishes to undergo a bilateral orchidectomy as part of sex reassignment  a bilateral
orchidectomy with two written psychiatric opinions may be available after commence-
ment of feminisation with hormone treatment, which might be commenced with one writ-
ten opinion only (Ahmad et al., 2013; Coleman et al., 2012; Wylie et al., 2014)
notwithstanding that some changes effected by hormones are irreversible (Gooren, 2011;
Spack, 2013; Wierckx et al., 2012), albeit of a potentially less significant nature than
those instigated by surgery. A similar argument can, of course, be made for trans men
who may receive masculinising hormone therapy following one opinion, but require two
opinions for a hysterectomy. The question then becomes whether the degree of difference
in the irreversible changes effected by the two interventions (hormones and surgery) is
significant enough to warrant the necessity of a second opinion in the latter case, espe-
cially, given the principles of the SoC, which claim to promote autonomy and choice.
Conclusion
The requirement for two written professional opinions for genital surgeries in the SoC is
normally referred to as a gold standard to which specialists in gender dysphoria must
adhere. The rationale for the two written qualified mental health professional opinions
rule concerns the prevention of harm to the trans patient, whilst, at the same time, a non-
trans patient is able to access genital surgery without any written qualified mental health
professional opinion. This suggests a difference in treatment between trans and non-trans
patients. Moreover, the fact that some trans persons, or persons presenting as trans, may
be on close examination, discovered to have other difficulties making genital surgeries
inappropriate at a particular time (or at all) does not mean that this will be so for all trans
people. Applying the two written qualified mental health professionals opinion rule to all
trans people, rather than those for whom it is clinically indicated, appears to be dispropor-
tionately prejudicial where the impact is delay, obstruction and differential treatment
(Fellmeth, 2011; Hale, 2007). Indeed, the agency of trans people should be at the centre
of trans health care (Lindemann, 2012; Whittle, Turner, & Al-Alami, 2007). Note we are
not arguing for an “anything goes” approach  rather that, when undertaken within a mul-
tidisciplinary/interdisciplinary team, it is possible to provide a robust assessment and
ongoing support to stable trans people such that the two-signature approval system is not
necessary. This is because it would not be commensurate with the clinical need, does not
afford equality of ethical practice with similar interventions, and would therefore be inap-
propriate. Of course, as we have seen, it will not be possible for clinicians to simply
change their practice to a single signature for genital surgery without putting themselves
at significant risk of censure and litigation and we therefore call upon lawmakers, and the
revisers of the SoC, as well as the relevant governing bodies and professional organisa-
tions to endorse such changes of practice in order for clinicians to more ethically work
with trans patients towards a patient-centred care which holds patient choice (and respon-
sibility for that choice) as well as that of the clinician to be key.
Notes
1. Trans men are people assigned female at birth but who identify as men.
2. Trans women are people assigned male at birth but who identify as women.
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3. A cisgender person is a person who is content to remain the gender they were assigned at birth.
4. Of course, not every person with gender dysphoria seeks GRS and it is not necessarily the
proper end of a given gender dysphoric person’s journey.
5. This is notably lower at around 0.025% within the Charing Cross Gender Clinic within the
United Kingdom National Health Service which has stringent criteria for referral.
6. A cisgender person is a person who is content to remain the gender they were assigned at birth.
7. The main mechanism by which the duty to provide care of an acceptable quality is fulfilled is
known as clinical governance.
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